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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants suggest that we recognize a for m of legislative 
immunity heretofore unknown in the law, one which can 
best be described as "partial legislative immunity." Thus, 
and it is not disputed, the immunity appellants assert 
would enable them to seek discovery, but not r espond to it; 
take depositions, but not be deposed; and testify at trial, 
but not be cross examined. Moreover , appellants 
presumably believe that when they come upon an aspect of 
the litigation they find disagreeable, as they find the 
discovery order at issue here to be, they will be able to 
pursue an interlocutory appeal in this Court. W e disagree, 
and will dismiss this interlocutory appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
In March 1998, suit was filed by students and parents, 
organizations, school district and city officials of the City of 
Philadelphia, and the City itself (hereinafter"appellees") 
alleging that the formula used by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania to allocate certain federal education monies 
violated the regulations adopted by the U.S. Department of 
Education implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. SS 2000d-2000d-7. See 34 C.F .R. S 100.3(b). More 
specifically, the complaint alleged that the Commonwealth's 
criteria and methods of funding public education yield 
racially discriminatory results in Philadelphia and other 
predominantly minority school districts. Injunctive and 
declaratory relief was sought against members of the state's 
executive branch, including the Governor , the Secretary of 
Education, the State Treasurer , and the Chair of the State 
Board of Education. 
 
In early May 1998, several leaders of the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly (the "Legislative Leaders") moved to 
intervene in the suit, citing their financial and legal 
interests in the litigation and the need to"articulate to the 
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Court the unique perspective of the legislative branch of the 
Pennsylvania government." App. at 48a. 1 That motion was 
unopposed, and was granted by the District Court. In their 
brief in support of intervention, the Legislative Leaders 
explicitly concurred in the motion to dismissfiled by the 
executive department defendants two days earlier; shortly 
thereafter, the legislators filed their own motion to dismiss 
or for judgment on the pleadings; and shortly after that, 
they filed yet another motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. The District Court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim. We reversed, emphasizing that the 
validity of appellees' claims could be tested only on a 
developed record and rejecting the Legislative Leaders' 
argument that plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain each 
count of their complaint. Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d 
Cir. 1999). Notably, we did not mention legislative 
immunity, be it partial or absolute, because it was, at least 
at that time, a non-issue. The Legislative Leaders and the 
executive branch defendants filed separate petitions for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Both 
petitions were denied. Ryan v. Powell, 528 U.S. 1046 
(1999); Ridge v. Powell, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999). 
 
The District Court, taking the cue from us, thereafter 
entered a scheduling order and appellees accordingly 
sought discovery from all defendants, both executive and 
legislative. The Legislative Leaders objected, asserting, for 
the first time, "legislative privilege." After a meeting between 
counsel for both sides, however, the Legislative Leaders 
agreed to search their files to deter mine what documents 
they possessed which would fall under the discovery 
requests. Ultimately they reported finding two boxes of 
documents, only 56 pages of which they deemed to be not 
privileged. Appellees then filed a Motion to Compel, which 
was granted, although because of a miscommunication 
between counsel, the Legislative Leaders' response to the 
motion was not received until after the District Court 
entered its order. That response, which included a 
multitude of objections to the discovery requests including 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Then then-proposed intervenors referred to immunity only in passing 
when they stated, in a footnote in their brief, that they do not waive any 
"speech or debate immunity" they may have. App. at 37a. 
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"legislative privilege," was, however, considered by the 
Court in connection with the Legislative Leaders' motion for 
reconsideration. The Court gave the objections short shrift, 
finding that our prior decision stressed the"importance of 
Plaintiffs' ability to conduct discovery" and, in light of this 
"mandate," denied the motion for reconsideration. The 
Legislative Leaders have now appealed the or der granting 
the Motion to Compel.2 
 
II. 
 
"As a general rule, discovery orders ar e not final orders of 
the district court for purposes of obtaining appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291." In re Ford Motor Co., 
110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Hahnemann Univ. 
Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir . 1996)). The 
collateral order doctrine excepts from this prohibition a 
narrow range of interlocutory decisions. In re Montgomery 
County, 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir . 2000) (citing Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). To come 
within the doctrine, an interlocutory decision must 
conclusively determine the disputed issue, the issue must 
be completely separate from the merits of the action, and 
the decision must be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment. Id. (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). 
 
Just recently, in Bacher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52 
(3d Cir. 2000), we discussed the applicability of the 
collateral order doctrine to discovery or ders. In Bacher, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Appellees contend that the Legislative Leaders should have appealed 
the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration rather than the order 
granting the Motion to Compel. Without pausing to decide that issue, we 
note that "decisions on the merits are not to be avoided on grounds of 
technical violations of procedural rules," Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal 
Associates, 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir . 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 823 
(1996). This Court will exercise appellate jurisdiction over orders not 
specified in the notice of appeal where "(1) there is a connection between 
the specified and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the 
unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not 
prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues." Id. (citations 
and internal quotations omitted). Each of those conditions is met here. 
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defendant insurance carrier contended that "sensitive" 
information regarding previous settlements ought to be 
privileged from discovery. Id. at 55. W e found that in light 
of Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999), 
Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 
(1994), and the approach taken by other courts of appeals 
-- which, we noted, prohibit immediate r eview of discovery 
orders even when privilege issues are involved -- the 
collateral order doctrine does not reach appeals of discovery 
orders "beyond the narrow categories of trade secrets and 
traditionally recognized privileges, such as attorney-client 
and work product." Bacher, 211 F .3d at 57 (emphasis added).3 
Underlying these narrow exceptions to the general rule of 
non appealability is a concern that wher e confidential 
information is sought, there is no way, absent immediate 
appeal of the order requiring disclosur e, to "unscramble the 
egg scrambled by the disclosure." For d, 110 F.3d at 963. It 
bears mention that even if legislative immunity in its 
traditionally recognized form wer e similarly bottomed on 
confidentiality, which it is not, the Legislative Leaders 
explicitly disavow any such interest. 
 
It is beyond argument that absolute legislative immunity 
represents a traditionally recognized privilege, and orders 
denying legislative immunity have often been r eviewed 
under the collateral order doctrine. Absolute immunity, 
after all, creates not only protection fr om liability, but also 
a right not to stand trial. Montgomery County , 215 F.3d at 
373 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)). 
"Thus, interlocutory review of the Appellants' absolute 
immunity claims is necessary to preserve the pr otections 
such immunity affords." Id. In light of such clear case law, 
the jurisdictional hurdle discussed in Bacher would not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We even more recently examined an interlocutory appeal of a discovery 
order in Pearson v. Miller, 211 F .3d 57 (2000). Writing only a few days 
after the Bacher decision, we found jurisdiction under the collateral 
order doctrine. Id. at 64-65. Pearson is clearly distinguishable from what 
is at issue here. The information sought in Pearson was confidential and 
the privilege asserted was based upon specific confidentiality provisions 
of three state statutes. Id. at 62-63. The Legislative Leaders, by 
contrast, 
do not assert a privilege under state law nor any interest in 
confidentiality. 
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stand in the way of a legislator asserting facts giving rise to 
a colorable claim of legislative immunity. 
 
This is not such a case. Although Bacher found that the 
collateral order doctrine "should apply to broad categories 
of interlocutory orders, without concer n for the individual 
circumstances of particular cases," Bacher, 211 F.3d at 56 
(citing Digital Equipment, 511 U.S. at 868), the Legislative 
Leaders stray far beyond the bounds of traditional 
legislative immunity, territory they surely r ecognize. 
Legislative immunity, they explain, is a doctrine which 
"protects state legislators absolutely fr om liability for their 
legislative activities. It also provides legislators with 
protection from the burden of defending themselves when 
engaged in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." 
Appellants' Br. at 14-15 (citations and inter nal quotations 
omitted). Furthermore, they add, legislative immunity 
"protects against disruption to the legislative process, 
which civil discovery invariably precipitates." Id. at 44, 
n.14. All of this, of course, is correct. 
 
Despite their understanding of legislative immunity's 
broad parameters, however, the Legislative Leaders are not 
seeking immunity from this suit which, it must be 
remembered, they voluntarily joined. Nor are the Legislative 
Leaders seeking any kind of wholesale protection from the 
burden of defending themselves. Instead, the Legislative 
Leaders build from scratch a privilege which would allow 
them to continue to actively participate in this litigation by 
submitting briefs, motions, and discovery requests of their 
own, yet allow them to refuse to comply with and, most 
likely, appeal from every adverse order . As we noted at the 
outset, and as the Legislative Leaders conceded at oral 
argument, the privilege they propose would enable them to 
seek discovery, but not respond to it; take depositions, but 
not be deposed; and testify at trial, but not be cr oss- 
examined. In short, they assert a privilege that does not 
exist. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Legislative Leaders have failed to 
come up with even one case which hints at the existence of 
the privilege they press. Moreover , every case which they do 
cite to support this privilege features, in dir ect contrast to 
this case, a defendant or a target of a subpoena seeking to 
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extricate himself or herself completely fr om various legal 
entanglements. See, e.g., Burtnick v. McLean, 76 F.3d 611 
(4th Cir. 1996); Brown & W illiamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir . 1995); MINPECO, S.A. v. 
Conticommodity Services, Inc., 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 
1988); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 
(9th Cir. 1983); 2BD Assoc. Limited v. County 
Commissioners for Queen Anne's Co., 896 F . Supp. 528 (D. 
Md. 1995); Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. 
Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292 (D. Md. 1992); Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity v. New York, 179 Misc. 2d 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1999). 
 
Unlike the reluctant participants in the cases upon which 
they rely, the Legislative Leaders voluntarily installed 
themselves as defendants. And, unlike the reluctant 
participants in those cases, the Leaders wish to r emain as 
defendants and participate as long as this case is around; 
at no time, we note, have they invoked legislative immunity 
as a basis for any of their various motions to dismiss. This 
is simply not a case of legislators caught up in litigation in 
which they do not wish to be involved. Rather , these are 
self-made defendants who seek to turn what has heretofore 
been the shield of legislative immunity into a swor d. 
 
A proper invocation of legislative immunity would 
typically call for the dismissal of a legislator fr om the 
lawsuit. Cases cited by the parties abound with examples of 
this complete remedy rather than the piecemeal remedies 
sought here. See, e.g., Supr eme Court of Virginia v. 
Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 733- 
34 (1980) (stating that if legislative immunity applied, 
"defendants in that suit could successfully have sought 
dismissal on the grounds of absolute legislative immunity") 
(emphasis added); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 511 n.17 (1975) (while immunity does 
not absolve legislators of the responsibility of filing a motion 
to dismiss, such motions must be swiftly r esolved); Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505-06 (1969) (citing prior 
cases in which the Court dismissed actions against 
members of Congress under the protection of the Speech 
and Debate Clause); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 ("the essence 
of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to 
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have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action."); 
Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth, 152 F .3d 240, 254 
(3d Cir. 1998) (legislators' motion to dismiss granted for 
acts taken in legislative capacity). 
 
Not only is dismissal of the legislator the logical and 
eminently appropriate result where legislative immunity 
applies, it also is the remedy which best furthers the 
underlying goals of the doctrine. As we have observed, 
"[l]egislative immunity must be applied pragmatically, and 
not by labels. Thus, without attempting to draw a line for 
all cases, we examine whether [the] request for prospective 
relief 8 [can] be accorded consistent with the policies 
underlying legislative immunity." Larsen, 152 F.3d at 253. 
We, too, need not attempt to set out the pr ecise parameters 
of legislative immunity for cases yet to come. W e find it 
manifestly clear, however, that absolute legislative immunity 
was at the heart of cases such as Larsen. The privilege 
described by the Legislative Leaders would not pr otect them 
absolutely from the burdens of this litigation and, therefore, 
is outside the bounds of traditional legislative immunity. 
"Legislators are immune from deterr ents to the uninhibited 
discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private 
indulgence but for the public good." T enney v. Brandhove, 
341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). See also United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972) (shield of legislative 
immunity "does not extend beyond what is necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the legislative pr ocess"); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (cautioning that 
privileges "are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed"). 
 
The opinion concurring in the judgment only because, in 
its view, Larsen establishes our jurisdiction, would open the 
doors of our Court, albeit briefly, where the"privilege" 
invoked has, in the words of the distinguished author of 
that opinion, "no basis in law" and has "never been 
recognized by this, or any other, court . . . ." Conc. Op. at 
13. Those doors must open, in her view, because we cannot 
in the course of our jurisdictional analysis even peek to see 
whether we are presented with a traditionally recognized 
privilege as that would involve touching on the merits. But 
if this view were to prevail, Bacher  would be rendered 
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4. The corollary to our finding of no jurisdiction under Bacher is that 
the 
Legislative Leaders have not, at least as of yet, invoked absolute 
legislative immunity. Neither the District Court nor this Court, 
therefore, 
has been presented with the question -- and, given our lack of 
jurisdiction, we do not decide -- whether such immunity would be 
available to voluntary intervenors such as the Legislative Leaders, or 
whether the very act of intervening has waived the privilege. 
meaningless; indeed, a confined examination of at least 
certain underlying facts was necessary in Bacher  and would 
inevitably be necessary in applying Bacher. In any event, it 
appears that, under the concurring opinion itself, a peek at 
the merits would be in order, for it concludes that our 
collateral order jurisdiction is trigger ed by calling the 
privilege " `legislative' . . . in a case involving legislators 
acting in a legislative capacity," Conc. Op. at 14, a 
paradigm merits determination. 
 
Because the purported privilege the Legislative Leaders 
invoke is assuredly not only not "traditionally recognized," 
but is not even suggested by any reasonable r eading of the 
applicable case law, Bacher requir es that we dismiss this 
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.4 We note that, 
as in any civil case, the Legislative Leaders r emain 
protected by the District Court's power to limit discovery 
which is unreasonably cumulative, more easily obtainable 
from another source, or unduly bur densome. Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 26(b)(2). 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
I agree with the Majority that the asserted legislative 
immunity from discovery has no basis in law and must be 
denied. The immunity asserted is unprecedented in its 
scope and breadth. The four Legislative Leaders, who 
knowingly and voluntarily intervened as defendants in this 
litigation and wish to remain as such, ar gue that they 
should enjoy all the rights associated with being parties to 
federal litigation while bearing none of the bur dens or 
responsibilities. I have found nothing to support the idea 
that a state legislator who remains a party to civil litigation 
is immune from compliance with discovery. Indeed, not 
only has such a privilege never been recognized by this, or 
any other, court, but it might conceivably violate an 
opposing party's due process rights wer e we to recognize it. 
 
In my view, however, the lack of merit in the Legislative 
Leaders' claim of immunity does not mean, as the Majority 
holds, that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under the Collateral Order Doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), and its progeny. 
Rather, the lack of merit means that the claim of immunity 
should be denied for just that reason -- it lacks merit. It is 
established law in this Circuit that the denial of a claim of 
legislative immunity is immediately reviewable under 
Cohen. See Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 152 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir . 1998). In my view, 
Larsen establishes our jurisdiction here to review the merits 
of the claimed immunity. 
 
It is true that the Legislative Leaders raise their claimed 
privilege in a different context -- as immunity from 
discovery while remaining parties to the civil action, not as 
immunity from liability or from having to be parties to the 
action at all. See, e.g., Supr eme Court of Virginia v. 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 
732-33 (1980). But that does not, as the Majority holds, 
change the fact that the Legislative Leaders assert a 
privilege that is a by-product of their status as legislators, 
just as their recognized immunity from liability and from 
having to defend themselves is a by-product of their status 
as legislators. See id. Clearly, the immunity that the 
Legislative Leaders claim is "legislative." The merits of their 
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claimed privilege must be irrelevant to our jurisdictional 
analysis. 
 
In my view, the Majority errs by conflating a merits 
analysis into its jurisdictional conclusion. The Majority 
recognizes that the Legislative Leaders claim that their 
immunity falls within the "legislative immunity" rubric, that 
the Legislative Leaders claim "a form of legislative immunity 
. . . ." Majority at 5. When the Majority subsequently states 
that the claimed immunity is "heretofor e unknown in the 
law," Majority at 5, and that the Legislative Leaders "assert 
a privilege that does not exist", id. at 9, that sounds to me 
like a decision on the merits. The Majority's conclusion that 
we lack jurisdiction appears to rest on the following 
reasoning: A claim of legislative immunity in a new context, 
which lacks merit, ceases to be a traditionally r ecognized 
privilege and is not reviewable under our decision in Bacher 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 57 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the collateral order doctrine should not be extended 
beyond the narrow categories of trade secr ets and 
traditionally recognized privileges). But this begs a 
question: If the asserted privilege is not "legislative" 
privilege because it is not a "colorable claim" or is not 
raised in the appropriate context, what is it? 
 
I believe that simply labeling the defense as "legislative" 
privilege, in a case involving legislators acting in a 
legislative capacity, is sufficient to trigger our collateral 
order jurisdiction, opening the door to immediate appellate 
review of the denial of such a claim, r egardless of the fact 
that the "legislative" immunity arises in a new or different 
context or may lack merit. To my mind, our jurisdiction in 
the instant case is compelled by our decision in Larsen, 
where we expressly held that we had collateral order 
jurisdiction over the denial of claims of legislative 
immunity. See Larsen, 152 F.3d at 245. 
 
Moreover, the District Court's or der compelling the 
Legislative Leaders to comply with discovery fits within the 
three-prong analytical framework that we have established 
for determining whether an order is r eviewable under 
Cohen: 1) it conclusively resolves the question of whether 
the Legislative Leaders must comply with discovery; 2) it 
resolves an important issue, immunity fr om discovery of 
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legislators who are parties to a case, that is separate from 
the merits of the case; and 3) it effectively is unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment because the Legislative 
Leaders would be required to comply with discovery before 
they can later assert their immunity. See In r e Ford Motor 
Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997). Particular emphasis 
should be placed on the last prong, granting jurisdiction 
over those orders that would be effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment, see Cunningham v. Hamilton 
County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999); Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); Ford Motor 
Corp., 110 F.3d at 958, meaning that the legal and practical 
value of the asserted privilege would be destr oyed if not 
vindicated prior to trial. See Lauro Lines SRL v. Chasser, 
490 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1989). 
 
The Majority relies on our decision in Bacher, supra. But 
that decision is not as limiting as the Majority suggests. 
Bacher does not stand for the proposition that a 
traditionally recognized privilege over which we would have 
collateral order jurisdiction, such as legislative immunity, 
ceases to be a traditionally recognized privilege merely 
because it is raised in a new context and ther efore ceases 
to be a colorable or meritorious claim of that privilege. 
Bacher did not involve a claim of a particular , identifiable 
privilege but was a case in which a party to a civil action 
attempted to appeal a run-of-the-mill discovery or der. The 
defendant there merely sought to avoid complying with 
simple discovery requests on the ground that the 
information sought (the amounts of past settlements paid) 
was confidential and not relevant and its disclosure would 
violate public policy, see Bacher, 211 F .3d at 53, but not 
because any privilege or immunity was implicated. Our 
conclusion that we lacked jurisdiction was not a new 
limitation on the collateral order doctrine but rather a 
consistent application of the long-standing rule that simple 
discovery orders are not final or ders subject to immediate 
review. See Bacher, 211 F.3d at 53 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 
110 F.3d at 958). Here, by contrast, the Legislative Leaders 
assert a defined, specific, well-established, traditionally 
recognized privilege or immunity, albeit with a twist. But 
that twist, regardless of its effect on the merits of the 
privilege claim, does not affect our jurisdiction and does not 
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turn this case into Bacher -- the claimed privilege remains 
legislative, it remains traditionally r ecognized, and it 
therefore should remain immediately r eviewable. 
 
Nor, as the Majority suggests, see Majority at 12, does 
Bacher require us to conduct a confined examination of the 
merits of the claimed privilege, only of the nature of the 
privilege, that is, of the type of immunity asserted. I suggest 
no differently. As I see it, we must look at the record, 
determine the nature or type of immunity asserted, and 
evaluate whether it is a traditionally recognized privilege, 
such as legislative immunity; this is precisely what Bacher 
commands. But looking at whether the immunity asserted 
is legislative, meaning asserted by legislators based on their 
official activity, and thus traditionally r ecognized, is not a 
merits determination. I have not taken "a peek at the 
merits," Majority at 12, just at the natur e of the privilege 
asserted. Only after concluding that the asserted privilege 
is legislative and that we therefore have collateral order 
jurisdiction, do I even broach the necessarily separate and 
distinct question of whether that claim of legislative 
immunity has merit in its current context. 
 
I am concerned with the impact that this ruling may have 
on future cases. It is not contested that plaintiffs could 
challenge the legality of legislative decisions by suing the 
executive officers charged with carrying out those 
decisions.* Further, it is clear that plaintiffs could sue 
municipalities for legislative actions and the municipalities 
themselves are not entitled to legislative immunity. See 
Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 1996). It also 
is clear that the individual legislators could not be named 
as defendants in such a case, or could be dismissed at an 
early stage if the suit were based upon their legislative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* It is worth noting that not all the Legislative Leaders' activities in 
funding education could be deemed legislative; some activities could be 
deemed executive and legislative immunity would not attach to such 
activities. See Carver v. Foerster, 102 F .3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1996) (an 
officer's executive or administrative actions ar e separate from 
legislative 
actions). For example, the record r eflects that two of the Legislative 
Leaders are ex officio members of the Pennsylvania Board of Education, 
an executive department; any actions in that r ole properly should be 
deemed executive. 
 
                                16 
  
activities. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52-54 
(1998); Supreme Court, 446 U.S. at 733-34. But we have 
not addressed whether a non-party legislator would be 
legislatively immune from being made to comply with 
subpoenas for discovery in a civil action. 
 
The Fourth Circuit has decided this issue, holding that 
non-party legislators cannot be made to testify or provide 
evidence as to their legislative activities or their motives. 
See Burtnick v. McLean, 76 F.3d 611, 613 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Berkley v. Common Council of the City of Charleston , 63 
F.3d 295, 303 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (suggesting, but 
not holding, that prior law indicates that members of the 
council would be privileged from testifying). W e have, on the 
other hand, noted that the intent-based inquiry that is part 
of certain doctrines in constitutional law necessarily means 
that judicial inquiry into legislative motive is not per se 
forbidden in such cases. See Carver, 102 F .3d at 104; see 
also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metr opolitan Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977) (stating that in some 
extraordinary circumstances, the members of a legislative 
body might be called to testify about legislative actions, 
although this is usually to be avoided). We also have held 
that a state legislator may be subpoenaed to pr ovide 
evidence to a grand jury of which the legislator is not the 
target. See In re Grand Jury (Granite Purchases), 821 F.2d 
946, 958 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
The immunity of a non-party legislator from civil 
discovery thus is an open issue in this Circuit, one that we 
may be called upon to resolve at some point. But suppose 
that case were to arise and the District Court were to reject 
the claimed privilege and order the non-party legislator to 
comply with the subpoena and provide testimony and 
discovery. Would we have jurisdiction immediately to review 
that order? As I read today's decision, the answer is no. I 
see no way to distinguish the future case fr om the instant 
case. A privilege from discovery by a non-party legislator 
would be as new in this Circuit as the privilege that the 
Legislative Leaders seek to assert in the instant case; it 
would not be a traditionally recognized privilege, foreclosing 
our immediate review under the Majority's r eading of 
Bacher. We could not distinguish this future case from the 
 
                                17 
  
instant one by saying that those legislators ar e asserting a 
legislative privilege (that is, a privilege that they possess by 
virtue of and in connection with their positions and 
activities as legislators) and that legislative immunity is a 
traditionally recognized privilege, because the Legislative 
Leaders here assert a privilege that unquestionably is 
"legislative" under such a definition. The only possible 
distinction between the instant case and the futur e case is 
that the latter might have more merit than the former, that 
it might be a colorable application of legislative immunity. 
But such consideration of the merits of a privilege must be 
irrelevant to the question of our jurisdiction. 
 
If legislative privilege from civil discovery exists, either for 
a party, as in the instant case, or for a non-party as it may 
arise in the future, it exists to protect legislators from the 
burden of having to respond to discovery and of having to 
deal with the distractions and disruptions that discovery 
imposes on their ability to carry out their gover nmental 
functions. See Supreme Court, 446 U.S. at 733; Larsen, 152 
F.3d at 245; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 529- 
30 (1985) (same with respect to qualified executive 
immunity). But a privilege from discovery (assuming, 
arguendo, it exists in either situation) is worthless if it 
cannot be vindicated prior to the legislators being forced to 
comply with discovery. Yet the Majority's approach 
effectively renders any possible claim of a legislative 
discovery privilege unreviewable until after discovery has 
been obtained. I cannot agree with such a limitation on our 
appellate jurisdiction. 
 
Because I find that we do have jurisdiction over the 
Legislative Leaders' appeal, my next step would be to reach 
the merits of the claimed privilege. I would r eject the 
privilege on its merits. In this regard, much of my 
reasoning is similar to that of the Majority. Indeed, that 
suggests to me that the Majority is, in fact, conducting a 
merits analysis of the immunity claim and, in ef fect, 
rejecting the Legislative Leaders' claim on that basis. 
 
The Legislative Leaders knowingly, willingly, and 
voluntarily entered this case by intervening as defendants. 
They explicitly wish to remain as defendants. And they 
repeatedly insist that they should be tr eated the same as all 
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other defendants, as if they had been named in the original 
filing, entitled to all the privileges and rights of parties to 
civil litigation. It follows, I believe, that they waived any 
immunity from discovery by the decision to enter and 
remain in the case and to assert their rights as defendants. 
 
The Legislative Leaders have pointed to no case in which 
a legislator who is a party to a civil action has been held to 
be immune from discovery. Every case the Legislative 
Leaders cite in their briefs and at oral argument involves 
attempts to take discovery in a civil case fr om legislators 
who are not parties to the case. See Burtnick, 76 F.3d at 
613; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 
F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As discussed supra, we 
have not determined whether such immunity exists in this 
Circuit and I offer no opinion as to whether such privilege 
should exist. But none of these cases supports the 
proposition that a legislator who chooses to become a party 
to a civil action is immune from discovery. 
 
The party/non-party distinction is critical. Legislative 
immunity is intended to protect legislators fr om having to 
divert their time, energy, and attention fr om their legislative 
tasks in order to defend themselves or to pr ovide evidence 
in a civil action. It protects legislators fr om the potential 
harassment, disruption, and distraction that would come 
with the burden of having to defend themselves and/or 
provide evidence. See Supreme Court , 446 U.S. at 733; 
Grand Jury, 821 F.2d at 958. But the pr ophylactic function 
of the immunity is undermined once the Legislative Leaders 
choose to join the case. They have willingly subjected 
themselves to any disruptions and distractions that go with 
being party to civil litigation. They cannot now claim that 
they should be protected from the disruptions and 
distractions that they voluntarily undertook. 
 
The Legislative Leaders attempt to downplay the 
significance of their intervention. Although they certainly 
recognize that legislative immunity may be waived, see 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 520 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that criminal defendant 
legislator's claim that he was impermissibly deposed was 
"unpersuasive" where the deposition was voluntary and the 
defendant waived any privilege); Burtnick, 76 F.3d at 613 
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(holding that non-party's privilege from being compelled to 
testify could be waived), the Legislative Leaders suggested 
at oral argument that intervening did not waive their 
privilege because any such waiver was not sufficiently 
explicit. I cannot conceive, however, of a more explicit 
waiver of immunity than willingly submitting oneself to the 
jurisdiction of a federal district court. If the Legislative 
Leaders had been named as defendants in the first instance 
and had failed to assert their legislative immunity as an 
affirmative defense, they unquestionably could be deemed 
to have waived that immunity. Intervening places them in 
the identical position. 
 
I find helpful the analysis of the District Court in an 
analogous situation, in May v. Cooperman , 578 F. Supp. 
1308 (D. N.J. 1984), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in 
relevant part, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985). In May, four 
members of the New Jersey legislature, r epresenting that 
body, intervened as defendants in a S 1983 action to defend 
the constitutionality of a state statute because the 
executive refused to defend it. After the law was struck 
down, the District Court assessed attorneys' fees against 
the legislative defendants, under 42 U.S.C. S 1988; the 
legislators argued that they were absolutely immune from 
an award of attorneys' fees for their legislative activity. The 
District Court rejected this argument, holding that the 
legislators had interjected themselves into the lawsuit by 
intervening and becoming parties, thereby waiving their 
legislative immunity from incidents of suit, such as 
attorneys' fees. See May, 578 F . Supp. at 1316-17. The 
District Court distinguished prior immunity cases, such as 
Supreme Court, because the New Jersey legislators had 
chosen to intervene and assume defense of the statute. See 
id. at 1317. 
 
Similarly, compliance with discovery, and being 
compelled to comply with requests for documents, 
information, and testimony, are incidents of suit. 
Regardless of whether the Legislative Leaders would have 
been immune from such incidents as non-parties, it is clear 
that they surrendered any immunity fr om discovery by 
voluntarily and willingly entering and remaining in the 
action as party defendants. 
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I close by emphasizing that my analysis and the 
Majority's analysis are very similar in denying the asserted 
legislative immunity from discovery. The dif ference is that 
the Majority concludes that the lack of merit takes the 
immunity outside the bounds of legislative immunity and 
divests us of collateral order doctrine jurisdiction. I 
conclude that, because the asserted immunity is 
"legislative," we have collateral order jurisdiction. The lack 
of merit to the claim of immunity means the claim should 
be denied on its merits. I would affirm the judgment of the 
District Court because the Legislative Leaders have waived 
any immunity from discovery. They are as subject to 
production of documents and of testimony as is any other 
party. 
 
For the above reasons, I concur only in the judgment of 
the Court. 
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